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I. Introduction
American consumer protection law is undergoing a “sea-change” 1 from what
it was thirty to forty years ago to what it is today. The developments discussed in
this article are the most important changes in the law since the heyday of federal
* Carl M. Williams Professor of Law & Social Responsibility, University of Wyoming College
of Law. The author would like to thank Elizabeth Renuart, Sherrill Shaffer, and Jeff Sovern for their
thoughtful and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1

The phrase “sea-change” originated in The Tempest, by William Shakespeare, 1610. The full

quote is:
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consumer protection legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s.2 They also
represent a sea change, or transformative change, in the basic underlying theories
of consumer protection. This is reflected in the birth of the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, and in the shift from the use of pure disclosures as
consumer protection under the rational choice theory of economics, to a system
of regulation-based on the more realistic view of consumer decision-making as
revealed by behavioral economics. This article will provide an overview of these
changes, as well as the policies behind them.
As with most sea changes, a storm preceded these new developments. Most
agree the financial crisis of 2008 led to the current outpouring of new consumer
legislation at the federal level.3 The financial crisis that occurred following the
collapse of the housing bubble led to the loss of billions of dollars in the value
of securities, especially mortgage-backed securities. When the stock market
fell to record lows, a deep recession ensued. With the recession came a rise in
unemployment, a loss in the value of homes, and an increase in debt.4 Storm
clouds that foreshadowed the financial tempest came in the form of a rise in
subprime lending, including new forms of toxic and exotic mortgages,5 and huge
increases in household debt. Due to the securitization of mortgage loans, in which
loans were bundled together and sold to investors, the risk of fraud and deception

Full fathom five thy father lies:
Of his bones are coral made:
Those are pearls that were his eyes:
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
William Shakespeare, The Tempest 25 (Cricket House Books 2010).
This earlier era saw the passage of the Truth in Lending Act and associated consumer credit
statutes now codified as the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r. This was
also the era that gave us the Magnuson-Moss Warranty/Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312.
2

3
See Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1141,
1147–49 (2012); Kyle C. Worrell, Crisis as Catalyst for Federal Regulation in Financial Markets: The
Rise of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 16 Nexus: Chap. J. L. & Pol’y 195 (2010–11).

See generally Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in
the United States (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/
fcic_final_report_full.pdf. The Commission was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act (Public Law 111-21). Id.
4

Allen J. Fishbein & Patrick Woodall, Consumer Fed’n of America, Exotic or
Toxic? An Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for Consumers and
Lenders (2006), http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/housing/
Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf.
5
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in the making of the loan was left with the consumer and with investors holding
worthless mortgage-backed securities, while the real culprits were protected from
such risks.6
Many policy makers concluded that these bad outcomes were at least in part
caused by a lack of appropriate consumer protection regulation to curb some of
the worst abuses by Wall Street investment firms and big banks. Congress filled
this gap in 2009 and 2010 with an unprecedented wave of federal consumer
protection legislation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 7 (Dodd-Frank Act) created a new federal consumer
protection agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), clothed
with authority over providers of consumer financial services of all kinds, and
charged with protecting consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” acts or
practices in consumer financial services.8 The Dodd-Frank Act also included
the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, which contains a major
overhaul of the law of residential mortgages, including limits on unfair contract
clauses and broker compensation, and a new requirement that all lenders base
loans on the consumer’s ability to repay, rather than solely on the collateral.9 In
2009, just prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress had passed the
Credit CARD Act, which contained substantial new consumer protections with
regard to credit cards, including limits on rate increases, reforms of creditor billing
practices, and improvements on required disclosures.10
This article will provide an overview of these new laws, explain how they
differ from prior consumer protection laws, and address the merits of this new
direction in consumer protection. Part II discusses the creation of the CFPB, how
it was based on the need to correct some structural flaws in the architecture of
consumer protection in the financial sector, as well as the need for a consumer
protection agency that could employ the insights of behavioral economics to
fashion regulations that are more effective. A contrast between the new CFPB
and the Federal Trade Commission,11 which had been the major federal consumer

6
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder
in Due Course Doctrine, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 503 (2002); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2185 (2007).
7

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.

8

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491–5531 (2011).

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, tit. XIV (2010) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(b)–(c)). See generally Dee Pridgen & Richard M. Alderman, Consumer
Credit and the Law ch. 9A (2012).
9

Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11124, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 1637).
10

The FTC also has authority to regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as well as
“[u]nfair methods of competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2011). The FTC has both a Bureau of
Consumer Protection and a Bureau of Competition. 16 C.F.R. § 0.9 (2012).
11
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protection agency in the United States for almost one hundred years, is also
included in Part II. Part III describes a related shift in consumer financial protection
from the purely disclosure remedies characteristic of the Truth in Lending Act, to
the more substantive limitations that are characteristic of the Credit CARD Act
and the Mortgage Reform Act. This change in focus is arguably based on a move
from the rational consumer choice theory that underpinned the Truth in Lending
Act and other earlier consumer protection legislation, to more of a reliance on the
relatively new field of behavioral economics. Part IV will describe in more detail
the provisions of the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act and the
Credit CARD Act to demonstrate the move from a reliance solely on consumer
choice and rational choice theory to a legal regime based more on the teachings
of behavioral economics. Part V will conclude the article with an analysis of the
disadvantages and advantages to consumers of the new approach to consumer
protection documented in the preceding sections.

II. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
A. The Structural Flaws in Consumer Financial Protection
Prior to the creation of the CFPB, consumer financial protection at the
federal level was not working effectively for consumers, due in part to the way
it was set up. Under the federal umbrella statute known as the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, consumer protection for financial services customers was spread
out over several bank regulatory agencies and the Federal Trade Commission,12
with each of the bank regulatory agencies having sometimes conflicting missions
of ensuring the safety and soundness of their regulatory “clients.” No one agency
focused on the whole spectrum of consumer financial protection. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has an overall consumer protection focus but no
jurisdiction over banks. The FTC only regulates nonbank entities that offer
financial services.13 Bank regulatory agencies had jurisdiction over banks, but did
not have an overall consumer protection focus.14
While consumers under the prior regulatory scheme were not being well
served in their efforts to shop around for the best deal in credit products, regulated
banks could shop around for the best (least interfering) regulator by choosing to

12

15 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1681s, 1692l, 1693o (2011).

13

Id. § 45(a)(2).

See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 85–97
(2008); Adam J. Levitin, Pew Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper #3: The Consumer Financial
Protection Agency, http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Financial_Reform/Pew-Levitan-CFPA.pdf. See also Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Pro
tection Bureau: An Introduction (Geo. Univ. L. Ctr., Jan. 11, 2013 Version), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2199678.
14
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be chartered by either the state or federal government. Those regulators both
enforced consumer protection and other rules on their chartered entities, and
derived revenues from them. Thus, if one chartering entity imposed unwelcome
regulation on a bank, the regulated bank might choose to change its charter to a
more compatible agency. Some scholars called the competition among agencies
for regulatory clients a “race to the bottom” because the banks chose, and the
regulatory agencies offered, the least possible amount of regulation despite the
interest of consumers in protection from certain abuses.15 Many states attempted
to impose limits on federally chartered banks that were allegedly engaging in
predatory lending practices, but these state laws were preempted and the federal
regulators did not offer consumers equivalent protection.16 Indeed, some critics
viewed federal preemption as a covert effort to deregulate the residential lending
market.17 This strong federal preemption was extended to subsidiaries of national
banks as well.18 In addition, under an historic ruling by the Supreme Court in
1978, a federally chartered bank would be governed by the usury and other laws
of the state in which the bank was located rather than where the borrower was
located.19 This gave banks the incentive to choose a federal charter and locate in
states with very little consumer protection regulation.

B. How the Legislation and the CFPB Address These Structural Flaws
The Dodd-Frank Act addressed these structural issues regarding consumer
financial protection when it created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB).20 This move will change the face of consumer protection for years to
come. The new agency was formed by consolidating the consumer protection
divisions of existing bank regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Reserve Board,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA),
and placing them under the umbrella of a single agency whose sole mission
is consumer financial protection.21 Thus, there is no incentive for either the
regulator or the regulated entities to shop around for a better deal because all
of the regulatory authority over consumer financial services is under one roof.

15

See Levitin, supra note 14, at 6–7.

16

See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000, 7.4007, 7.4008, 34.3, 34.4 (2013).

Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory
Agenda, 78 Temp. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
17

18

See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007).

See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
301 (1978).
19

20
The design of the new agency is widely credited to Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard Law
Professor (now a United States Senator) who acted as a Presidential Assistant to set up the CFPB.
See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy, Summer 2007.
21

12 U.S.C. § 5581 (2011).
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In addition, the applicable regulation does not depend on the type of entity or
financial product, so there will be more of a level playing field across all sectors
of consumer financial services. Another feature of the new law is that the CFPB
has authority to enforce all the pre-existing consumer financial services laws, the
so-called “enumerated laws,” which mostly consist of the statutes included in the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, such as the Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. The FTC and the bank regulatory agencies
had previously enforced these laws with the Federal Reserve Board authoring the
relevant regulations.22
The Dodd-Frank Act lessened the federal preemption of state consumer
protection law, so banks no longer have a motive to change charters to get a
better deal from the federal regulatory agencies. The new law contains a specific
preemption provision that cuts back significantly on federal preemption and
allows much more leeway for states to enforce their own consumer protection
laws in the area of consumer financial protection as long as the state laws are
not inconsistent with federal law and are more protective of consumers than the
federal standard.23 Thus, the federal law is a floor or minimum level of consumer
protection, but states can be more protective if they deem it necessary. This is the
same type of preemption standard found in the Truth in Lending Act,24 which
allows the states to act as laboratories for different consumer protection measures
prior to adoption at the federal level. A possible downside of this provision is
that consumer credit providers may end up facing varying requirements across
different states, which can add to compliance costs.25

C. The CFPB Is More Powerful and Potentially More Effective than the FTC
When designing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Congress
had before it several different templates of regulatory agencies. First, Congress
created the traditional independent regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, to operate outside of
the direct control of the executive branch, but with some oversight and involvement
by both the federal legislature and the executive branch. These agencies have
some guarantees of independence, such as set terms for Commissioners, and no
veto powers for Congress. Congress funds the independent regulatory agencies,
however, and thus can control the agencies indirectly. The Federal Reserve System

22

Id. §§ 5481(12), (14), 5564, 5565.

23

Id. § 5551(a)(1), (2).

24

15 U.S.C. § 1610 (2011).

David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency
Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 277, 317 (2010).
25
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has a Board of Governors appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, much like the independent regulatory agencies, but it is also the central
banking system and derives much of its revenue from the banks that participate
in the federal reserve system.26 A percentage of this revenue goes to fund the
Federal Reserve Board, making it less dependent on Congress than the other
regulatory agencies.
The CFPB is different from the model of either the independent regulatory
agency as embodied by the FTC, or the Federal Reserve Board, of which the
CFPB is a part. Congress created the Federal Trade Commission in 1914. It has
been the major American consumer protection agency since the 1930s when
Congress added a specific consumer protection mission to the FTC Act. In 2010,
almost one hundred years after the FTC was established, the legislation creating
the CFPB used a template, which is a slight hybrid between the independent
regulatory agency model and the Federal Reserve Board. Several pertinent
differences between the CFPB and the FTC make the CFPB arguably a stronger
and hence more effective protector of consumers than the FTC. Each of these
differences will be discussed in turn below.
First, the CFPB has a different funding mechanism than the FTC. The
CFPB is an “independent bureau” within the Federal Reserve System.27 Funding
comes from revenues of the Federal Reserve, and the Bureau is guaranteed further
appropriations (within stated limits) on request by the CFPB Director.28 This
is similar to the funding of other bank regulatory agencies, such as the Federal
Reserve itself, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. By contrast,
Congress funds the FTC and in the past has exercised its “power of the purse”
to limit the FTC’s ability to act. For example, when the FTC proposed to ban
television advertising aimed at children in the late 1970s, a proposal known
as the “kid-vid” rule, Congress cut off funding for any FTC rule based on the
“unfairness” prong of its statute.29 Having the CFPB funded more like its bank
regulatory predecessors, by contrast, should help avoid such political turmoil and
possible undue strangulation of the agency.
A second difference between the CFPB and the FTC is the way the agency
is internally governed and organized. The President appoints a single director
to run the CFPB for a five-year term, subject to approval by the Senate.30 By

Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Federal Reserve System: Purposes
& Functions 4, 11 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.
26

27

12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2011).

28

Id. § 5497.

See J. Howard Beales, III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that
Advises the Present, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 873, 878–80 (2004).
29

30

12 U.S.C. § 5491(b), (c) (2011).
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contrast, the FTC is run by five commissioners, also appointed by the President
and approved by the Senate for seven-year staggered terms. No more than three
FTC commissioners can be from the same political party.31 The need for the FTC
Commissioners to muster a majority of their number to approve any action may
provide somewhat of a brake on the consumer protection activities of the FTC
whereas an agency like the CFPB, with a single director, may be able to take action
more swiftly when needed to address emergent consumer issues.32 The CFPB also
has four “special function units” that focus on particular issues or populations
within the new agency. These units include the Office of Fair Lending and Equal
Opportunity, the Office of Financial Education, the Office of Service Member
Affairs, and the Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans.33 The FTC,
on the other hand, has historically been divided into a Bureau of Consumer
Protection, a Bureau of Competition, and a Bureau of Economics.
Third, the CFPB has authority to take action to prevent “unfair, deceptive
and abusive practices” within the scope of its jurisdiction, i.e., consumer financial
service transactions.34 The FTC on the other hand, has authority over “unfair
or deceptive” practices only.35 The field of “unfair and deceptive” trade practices
under the FTC Act has a long history, and such practices are well defined both in
policy statements and in case precedent.36 The unfairness standard is defined in the
CFPB’s statute using the same definition as in the FTC Act.37 The CFPB statute
does not specifically define “deceptive” practices, but the Bureau has indicated
in its “Examination Manual” that it will adopt the FTC policy statements and
precedents on the meaning of “deceptive” practices (as well as “unfair” practices) in
the financial services context.38 The CFPB’s additional authority to curb “abusive”
practices creates a new standard, defined in the statute but not yet tested. The Act
defines an “abusive” practice as one that:
(1) [M]aterially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service; or
31

15 U.S.C. § 41 (2011).

32

Note that the OCC also functions under a single director, not a commission.

33

12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)–(g) (2011).

34

Id. § 5531(a).

35

15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2011).

Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (1983), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm; Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on
Unfairness (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/
ad-unfair.htm. See generally Pridgen & Alderman, supra note 9, ch. 9–11.
36

37

See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c).

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Supervision and Examination Manual, Version
2, 178–81 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-andexamination-manual-v2.pdf.
38
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(2) [T]akes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product
or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of
the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial
product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered
person to act in the interests of the consumer.39
This standard provides the CFPB with a unique and flexible authority to deal
with abuses in the consumer financial services sector 40 and to issue rules or initiate
enforcement actions to address the exploitation of certain consumer behavioral
biases by financial service providers.41 For instance, an “abusive” practice can be
one that “materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term
or condition” that is being marketed to them.42 This could potentially take care
of situations where the consumer may have accurate information in front of him,
based on federally mandated disclosures, but his understanding of it, or ability
to act rationally in relation to the information, is being hampered by certain
marketing practices.
While the “abusive” practices power is broad and currently uncharted, it is not
without limits. The statutory language itself creates a framework against which any
CFPB initiative based on this provision must be measured. In addition, while the
CFPB may have a broader general statutory mandate than the FTC by including
coverage of “abusive” practices in addition to “unfair and deceptive” practices, the
CFPB’s authority is narrower in focus than the FTC’s, the CFPB having authority
only over persons who offer or provide consumer financial products or services.
In addition, the CFPB’s authorizing statute contains specific exemptions from
CFPB jurisdiction for merchants selling nonfinancial goods or services, motor
vehicle dealers, persons regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
persons subject to a state insurance regulator, real estate agents, accountants,

39

12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).

See Carey Alexander, Note, Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle
to Protect Consumers, 85 St. John’s L. Rev. 1105 (2011), for a general discussion of the legislative
history of this section and analysis of the types of activities to which it might be applied. See also
Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection Act’s “Abusive”
Standard, 14 J. Consumer & Com. L. 118 (2011).
40

41
See Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 Brook. J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 107 (2012).
42

12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
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non-credit-extending tax preparers, attorneys, and others.43 The CFPB’s potential
regulatory action thus affects a smaller segment of the economy than the FTC
does, but it is a sector that had proven particularly troublesome for consumers in
the recent financial crisis that led up to the legislation.
Fourth, the CFPB has a more efficient and straightforward rulemaking
authority than the FTC. As a tool to implement its statutory mandate, the
CFPB has general rulemaking authority to curb “unfair, deceptive, and abusive”
practices using standard federal rulemaking procedures 44 as contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice and comment process.45 The CFPB’s
regulations are subject to review, however, and can be set aside if the Financial
Stability Oversight Council determines that the regulation “would put the safety
and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial
system of the United States at risk.” 46 The FTC, on the other hand, did not
obtain industry-wide rulemaking authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive”
trade practices until 1975, more than fifty years after the agency was established.
The FTC’s rulemaking authority was part of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty FTC
Improvement Act,47 and it contains many procedural hurdles that have had the
effect of preventing potential FTC trade regulation rules from being promulgated.
One problem with so-called Magnuson-Moss rulemaking at the FTC is that it is
an adjudication-like process, involving virtually unlimited witnesses and parties,
which results in an inefficient and drawn-out process.48 The result has been that
for the past several decades, the FTC has issued regulations only when Congress
specifically directed it to do so and where it is authorized to use APA notice and
comment rulemaking, as it was in the Telemarketing Sales Act.49 APA rulemaking
is a much more efficient process and is the norm for most federal agencies other
than the FTC. Because of this legislative peculiarity, the FTC has not issued

43

Id. § 5517.

44

Id. §§ 5512, 5531(b).

45

5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (2011).

12 U.S.C. § 5513(a) (2011). The CFPB’s regulations are also subject to the normal
rulemaking checks, such as the small business impact requirement, see 5 U.S.C. § 601–610 (2011);
the Congressional cost-benefit review requirement, see id. § 801; and a cost-benefit review by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget, see 44
U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3503 (2011); Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
46

47
See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2011). Further restrictions on the FTC’s rulemaking process
were added by the FTC Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 57b-3).
48
See Financial Services and Products: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Protecting
Consumers—Part II Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 26–34 (2010) (testimony of Dee Pridgen), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg57895/pdf/CHRG-111shrg57895.pdf.

15 U.S.C. § 6102(b) (2011) (resulting in the promulgation of the Telemarketing Sales
Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 310).
49
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many regulations under its more general “unfair and deceptive” trade practices
authority.50 Thus, the CFPB could be better situated than the FTC to issue
rules governing “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” financial services practices in the
future. Whether and how the CFPB will use this rulemaking authority remains to
be seen.
Despite the potential for bureaucratic warfare between two agencies both
charged with consumer protection, the CFPB and the FTC are poised to
become partners rather than rivals. Congress has given the CFPB enforcement
authority over “unfair, deceptive, and abusive” practices engaged in by consumer
financial service providers, as well as enforcement authority for specific consumer
credit statutes.51 Meanwhile, the FTC still has authority to enforce its own
statute as well as to enforce the consumer credit statutes (concurrently with
the CFPB) with regard to nonbank entities.52 The statute specifically requires
the CFPB to coordinate with the FTC and other relevant agencies “to promote
consistent regulatory treatment of consumer financial and investment products
and services.” 53
As to “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” practices under either agency’s
jurisdiction, there is no private right of action,54 which limits enforcement to the
relevant government agencies. This includes state governments in some cases as
well, given that there are provisions for state government enforcement of matters
under the jurisdiction of both the CFPB and the FTC. 55 However, there remains
a pre-existing private right of action to enforce specific consumer credit statutes,
such as TILA, ECOA, FCRA, or FDCPA, which has been in place since the
outset of these statutes.56
The CFPB was created to be more powerful than the well-established FTC
due in part to a growing realization by Congress that consumers needed an agency
that could act more quickly and effectively to protect consumers than the FTC

50

Pridgen & Alderman, supra note 9, § 12:10–12:14.

51

Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1147–49.

52

12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(5) (2011).

53

Id. § 5495. See also id. § 5514(c).

There is nothing in either the CFPB statute or in the FTC Act specifically creating a private
right of action. A theory that such a cause of action was implied in the FTC Act was definitively
rejected in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Pridgen &
Alderman, supra note 9, § 12:43.
54

See 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2011) for the CFPB. Many federal consumer laws have provisions
for state government enforcement, including many that are jointly enforced by the FTC. See Amy
Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in
Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 53 (2011).
55

56
See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2011) (TILA); id. §§ 1681n, 1681o (FCRA); id. § 1691e (ECOA);
id. § 1692k (FDCPA).
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or the bank regulatory agencies that preceded it. In addition, the CFPB is poised
to take advantage of the current shift in consumer behavior theory underpinning
the law of consumer protection, a shift away from the rational consumer choice
theory that supported a predominantly consumer disclosure regime, and toward
the more realistic and evidence-based theory of behavioral economics.

III. From “Homo Economicus” to Real Consumers
A. New Consumer Protection Law Tilts Toward “Behavioral Economics”
The creation of the CFPB was a distinct innovation in the design of consumer
protection agencies. As discussed above, the CFPB is neither an independent
regulatory agency nor a bank regulatory agency, but is something new and
more potent, meant to deal more effectively with a specific consumer protection
sector, namely financial services. However, the creation of the CFPB itself is
not the only big change in the consumer protection landscape. In addition,
certain federal statutes passed in 2009 and 2010 represent a major shift in the
underlying theoretical basis from the older consumer credit laws. The older
statutes and associated regulations relied on the hypothetical rational consumer
(“homo economicus”) to make rational choices when presented with all relevant
information. The new laws that will be discussed below, on the other hand,
incorporate the findings of behavioral economics, namely that real consumers
do not always act rationally in their own self-interest in making marketplace
decisions. Two areas in particular, involving residential mortgages (addressing
predatory residential mortgage lending practices) and credit cards, are examples
of this shift in legislative philosophy.
The last big wave of federal consumer protection can be traced back to
the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and
related consumer credit laws were passed and were codified under the umbrella
statute—the Consumer Credit Protection Act.57 Those laws, especially TILA,
which aimed to enhance comparative shopping for consumer credit, were based
on the economic theory that informed consumers would choose wisely in the
marketplace. It was presumed that if the law provided consumers with standardized
information about the comparative costs of competing credit products, then
the competitive marketplace would be able to function to maximize consumer
welfare.58 This is known as rational choice theory, premised on the existence of
“homo economicus,” a rational consumer choice maker who, by making rational
choices based on individual preferences, will lead to the best economic outcome

57

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2011). See Pridgen & Alderman, supra note 9, ch. 4.

See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 807 (2003); Edward L. Rubin,
Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth in Lending Act, 80 Geo. L.J. 233 (1991).
58
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for the market as a whole.59 Based on this theory, much of consumer credit law
took a pure disclosure approach to consumer protection in which consumers were
given relevant information about competing credit products, and were expected
to choose the one that maximized their welfare.60 Disclosure of information was
viewed as a panacea for imperfections in the market for consumer credit because,
in theory, disclosures of information alone could protect consumers and promote
competition while imposing the least cost on the market and meeting with the
least amount of political resistance.61
The impetus for the recently manifested change in approach to consumer
protection in the financial sector came from the work of behavioral economics
scholars. This research, which has resulted in the publication of influential studies
and articles from the 1990s to the present, questioned the premise that consumers
would always act rationally in their own self-interest if presented with adequate
information.62 Basically, these scholars concluded that rational choice theory does
not accurately describe how consumers actually behave in the marketplace.63
Behavioral economics scholars focused on certain cognitive barriers that prevent
many consumers from choosing rationally and revealed that marketers of credit
products may have actually exploited these flaws in consumer decision-making
for their own benefit.64 The new laws in the consumer finance sector appear to
take this new learning about consumer marketplace behavior to heart, and as a
result, we are seeing laws that feature more substantive limits, more pro-consumer
default provisions, and more disclosures based on consumer-behavior studies.

B. Why Disclosures Alone Did Not Prevent the Financial Crisis
Truth in Lending disclosures were well-established in the period leading up to
the foreclosure crisis of 2007–08. They are required for residential mortgage loans,
which tend to be for relatively large sums of money in transactions that often take
several weeks to be finalized, as well as for the opening of a consumer credit card
account, which can be approved on the spot or in a very short time. In both
situations, consumers did not appear to heed the warnings of minefields ahead
that were spelled out in the federally mandated disclosures and ultimately found
See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 323, 325–28
(2008); Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral
Economics, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 893, 899–901 (2010).
59

60

Peterson, supra note 58.

Dee Pridgen, Putting Some Teeth in TILA: From Disclosure to Substantive Regulation in the
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 615 (2012).
61

62
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 Minn. L. Rev.
749 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249 (2006); Alan
M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 Law & Ineq. 135 (2009).
63
Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat Choice: Some Thoughts on the Relationship Among
Rationality, Markets, and Human Beings, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1091 (2005).
64

See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373 (2004).
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themselves unable to pay their debts.65 These problems could have included a predetermined jump in monthly payments to unaffordable levels after the expiration
of an initially lower payment period, and pre-payment penalties that would make
refinancing of a mortgage too expensive at the time when the payments became
unaffordable. Other aspects of many mortgage loans that should have waved
large red flags in the face of a rational decision maker with a limited income
included variable rates, “interest only” payments, negative amortization, and
balloon payments.66 As for credit card deals, the solicitation disclosures should
have warned consumers that the initial low rate was set to expire in a relatively
short time, that the creditor could change the contract terms at any time, and
that there were going to be hefty penalties for late payments and over-the-limit
charges.67 So why did so many consumers appear to choose irrationally even when
presented with all the relevant terms and costs?
For the mortgage loan consumer, buying a home is often said to be the
largest financial investment in a person’s lifetime. Yet instead of resulting in
more caution, such a high-stakes transaction sometimes results in the triggering
of certain defense mechanisms that may cloud rational judgment.68 When faced
with such a great deal of information, consumers often experience “information
overload” and will only consider those variables that are most salient, such as
the amount of the closing costs and the initial monthly payment.69 Borrowers
who feel insecure about their creditworthiness may be overly trusting of a broker
or lender representative even if what the broker/lender says is contradicted by
written disclosures.70 In addition, due to the “endowment effect” of feeling they
Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the
Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 761 (2010).
65

66

Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 5.

15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2011); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(a), 1026.5(a) (2012). Throughout this
article, the author has provided parallel citations to 12 C.F.R. parts 226 and 1026. Prior to the
Dodd-Frank Act, 12 C.F.R. part 226—Regulation Z of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System—set forth the implementing regulations for TILA. Truth in Lending (Regulation
Z), 76 Fed. Reg. 79768-01 (Dec. 22, 2011). “[T]he Dodd-Frank Act transferred rulemaking
authority for TILA to the [CFPB].” Id. The CFPB’s new Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. part 1026
“substantially duplicates the [former] Regulation Z . . . making only certain non-substantive,
technical, formatting, and stylistic changes.” Id. See also 17 Am. Jur. 2d Consumer Protection § 4
(Supp. 2012).
67

68
Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis
of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 Psychol. Pub.
Pol’y & L. 85 (2010).
69
See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 Akron L. Rev. 725
(2005); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 Md. L. Rev. 707, 768 (2006).
70
See Jessica M. Choplin, Debra Pogrund Stark & Jasmine N. Ahmad, A Psychological
Investigation of Consumer Vulnerability to Fraud: Legal and Policy Implications, 35 Law & Psychol.
Rev. 61 (2011); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing
Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 617 (2009).
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already own the home being financed, consumers may not want to unwind the
transaction once unfavorable credit terms are presented.71 Another well-known
behavioral tendency of most consumers is to be overly optimistic about the future.
Thus, when faced with a contract disclosure that rates or payments are likely
to go up at a future point in time, many consumers will optimistically assume
that real estate prices will also go up, or that their own incomes will rise, so that
future penalties, balloon payments, or the inability to pay higher payments will
not be a problem.72 This type of unrealistic optimism or wishful thinking can lead
consumers to make choices that are not necessarily in their own self-interest.
Irrational consumer behavior can also play a role in credit card choices in
ways that are not likely to be alleviated by disclosure alone. Credit card debt
skyrocketed in the years prior to the recent financial crisis.73 Just as mortgage
lenders were required to make certain information disclosures to consumers prior
to their commitment to a loan, federal consumer protection law requires credit
card issuers to make certain credit cost information disclosures to consumers
with any credit card solicitation.74 Quite often, card issuers offered low “teaser
rates” or “no annual fee” in credit card offers, which were followed by increased
rates or the imposition of an annual fee after the card offer had been accepted
and the consumer had run up a balance.75 Credit card agreements specified that
the card issuer could change terms at any time, but most consumers may have
optimistically assumed that this would not affect them. In addition, consumers are
often “myopic” in the sense that they focus on the short-term costs and do not see
that far into the future when making marketplace choices. Another phenomenon
that may occur is “hyperbolic discounting,” by which consumers may overvalue
the immediate costs and benefits of a credit card deal, while undervaluing the
future costs and benefits.76 Thus, a fully disclosed temporary low teaser rate in a
credit card agreement may encourage consumers to accept the card, and borrow
fairly heavily during the teaser rate period, on the assumption that they will pay
off the balance before the low rate expires. Optimistically, consumers may also
assume that when the rate goes up, they will cease using the card, or use it less,

71
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 734 (1999).

Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94
Cornell L. Rev. 1073 (2009).
72

Credit card debt increased by 25% in the ten years preceding 2009, and reached
$963 billion in January of that year. H.R. Rep. No. 111-88, at 10 (2009). Also, at that time, more
than 75% of all U.S. families had a credit card and 44% carried a balance. Id.
73

74

See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2011); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(a), 1026.5(a) (2012).

75

See, e.g., Rossman v. Fleet Bank, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002).

Jonathan Slowik, Comment, Credit CARD Act II: Expanding Credit Card Reform by
Targeting Behavioral Biases, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1292, 1311–13 (2012).
76
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which is not always the case.77 In addition to rates, all potential fees associated
with credit cards are required to be disclosed prior to the account opening.78
However, certain “back end” fees and penalties such as over-the-limit fees, late
fees, and penalty rates are not “salient” to consumers in choosing credit cards,
even though they are fully disclosed, because these items do not take effect until
later, if at all. Even consumers who notice these fees and potential rate increases
may optimistically assume that they will not charge over their limit, will not pay
late, and will not default, so they do not factor in these costs when choosing credit
cards.79 Once consumers incur these additional costs, they face switching costs to
change to another card. Such costs include time spent shopping for information
on alternatives, paying off or transferring the balance on their current card,
changing previously established online or automatic payments with their bank,
and so on. Thus, the initial shortsighted choice of a credit card can be costly
to correct.

IV. New Substantive Provisions for Consumers Under
New Federal Laws
Given the shortcomings of the pure disclosure approach, as outlined above,
Congress changed course in the areas of residential mortgage loans and credit
cards. In two major consumer protection laws, the Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatory Lending Act of 2010 and the Credit CARD Act of 2009, Congress took
more of a substantive approach to consumer protection combined with improved
disclosures based on consumer behavior research. The substantive approach
relies less on the informed rational consumer to make the right choice based on
mandated disclosures and more on the law to provide minimum standards of
fair dealing with consumers. Some say this new type of law will result in the
unmooring of consumer protection law from its foundation in the consumer
welfare theories of antitrust economics.80 Others say this new approach is a more
realistic and effective way to protect consumers.

A. Residential Mortgage Loans
It is commonly agreed that the prevalence of certain types of “toxic” or
“exotic” subprime mortgages, that contained complex and consumer unfriendly
clauses, may have contributed to the rash of mortgage foreclosures that started in
2007–08. When housing prices started to plummet, many consumers realized
Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit Cards, 2011
Utah L. Rev. 339 (2011).
77

78

12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5a(b), 1026.60(b) (2012).

Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 Cornell
L. Rev. 967 (2012).
79

80
Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each
Other, 121 Yale L.J. 2216 (2012).
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they were locked into loans that they could not afford due to increasing adjustable
rates, “teaser” rates that were replaced with much higher rates and payments,
sky-high balloon payments, prepayment penalties that prevented refinancing, and
financing arrangements such as “interest only” payments that resulted in negative
amortization on their property.81 In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Act, Title XIV of which is known as the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act of 2010.82 This law came into effect in early 2013,83 and it contains
many pro-consumer provisions that go well beyond disclosure and rational
consumer choice.84 At the same time, disclosure and consumer choice has not been
abandoned as a regulatory stance. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act also contains some
specific directions to the new CFPB to improve the usefulness and readability of
early mortgage disclosures.
The CFPB is charged with combining and improving the readability of early
mortgage loan cost disclosures by combining the two separate disclosures that
had previously been mandated by two different regulatory agencies, the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) under TILA and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).85
This new disclosure will replace two confusing and sometimes conflicting
disclosures under the old law.86 In 2011, the CFPB launched an extensive “Know
Before You Owe” campaign that elicited comments on the disclosures and
conducted extensive consumer testing prior to issuing the proposed combined
disclosure.87 The revised disclosure promises to be a major improvement over
the prior disclosures and hopefully can guide consumers to more appropriate
mortgage loans. One very striking feature of the proposed disclosure, at least to
those schooled in the teachings of the Truth in Lending Act, is that the traditional

Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. Rev. 1243,
1252–54 (2011).
81

82
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, tit. XIV (2010).

The effective date of most of the provisions of the Mortgage Reform Act is January 21,
2013. § 1400(c), 124 Stat. 1376.
83

See generally Julie R. Caggiano, Jennifer L. Dozier, Richard P. Hackett & Arthur B. Axelson,
Mortgage Lending Developments: A New Federal Regulator and Mortgage Reform under the DoddFrank Act, 66 Bus. Law. 457 (2011).
84

85

12 U.S.C. § 5532(f ) (2011).

Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regu
lation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg. 51116-01 (Aug. 23, 2012)
(proposed rule with request for public comment), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docum
entDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0028-0001.
86

Id. See also Know Before You Owe, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, www.consumerfinance.
gov/knowbeforeyouowe (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
87
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unitary cost measure for consumer credit, the Annual Percentage Rate or APR,88
will be relegated to page three of the disclosure whereas it was formerly the most
prominent feature of the TILA disclosure. The CFPB found that contrary to the
hopes of the framers of TILA, most consumers still do not understand what the
APR is. The agency also found that the APR has become a less accurate yardstick
of mortgage costs due in part to the prevalence of adjustable rate mortgages and
open-end home equity lines of credit making it impossible to predict the actual
cost of credit for these types of loans.89 Thus, the new disclosure will put the
“interest rate,” rather than the APR, on the first page.
In addition to improving the existing disclosures, the new legislation contains
an array of substantive consumer protections for mortgage loan consumers in areas
where disclosure and consumer choice alone were deemed insufficient. The CFPB
is required to issue new regulations to implement these new requirements.90 The
main areas of substantive reform include:


Universal requirement of consumer “ability to repay” as a
condition for all residential mortgages; 91



Creation of a “safe harbor” for creditors who offer “qualified
mortgages” that have certain characteristics that are favorable
to consumers; 92



Ban on mortgage brokers steering consumers into
unfavorable loans and on accepting “yield spread premiums”
as compensation;93



Strict limits on prepayment penalties; 94



Ban on the financing of “single premium” credit insurance; 95

The regulation requires that the disclosure of the APR be accompanied by a brief description
such as “the cost of your credit as a yearly rate.” 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18(e), 1026.18(e) (2012).
88

Richard H. Thaler, A Chance To Make Mortgage Shopping Easier, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
2012, at BU3.
89

90
12 U.S.C. § 5538 (2011). Note that these provisions of the law do not go into effect until
either January 21, 2013 or when the CFPB issues the relevant regulations, whichever comes first.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1400(c), 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
91

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2011).

92

Id. § 1639c(b).

Id. §1639b(c)(1). This prohibition on YSP was foreshadowed by a Federal Reserve Board
regulation that contained a very similar provision. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d) (2012).
93

94

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c) (2011).

95

Id. § 1639c(d).
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Prohibition on pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in
most dwelling-secured consumer loans;96 and



Imposition of “appraisal independence requirements” in
all consumer credit transactions secured by the principal
dwelling of the consumer.97

423

Highlights of these substantive provisions of the Mortgage Reform Act are
summarized below.98
First, the new law has an “ability to repay” requirement. Although one
would think that creditors and consumers alike would naturally want to assure
themselves that the borrower had the ability to repay their loans, this was not
always the case. One of the practices that allegedly contributed to the foreclosure
crisis was that banks and other institutions were lending to people who could not
afford the loans they were being offered. Sometimes this practice stemmed from
the assumption that the lender could protect itself from default by foreclosure,
i.e., lending based on collateral. In other cases the improvident loan deals were
fueled by unscrupulous brokers who may have encouraged false or undocumented
loan applications and inflated appraisals to increase their commissions and who
then passed on the loans to lenders who would have to deal with the inevitable
default. In addition, when mortgages were sold to investors via “securitization,”
the originators could collect their fees and let the consumer worry about making
payments or suffer foreclosure because the investors, protected by the “holder-indue course doctrine,” did not bear much risk from whatever legal problems there
were with the original loan.99 Consumers also underestimated the risk of foreclosure
due to the previously discussed “optimism” bias and other cognitive barriers.100
Thus, the new law’s universal extension of an “ability to repay” requirement for
residential mortgages is a big step forward for consumers. Mortgage lenders will
have to engage in more responsible lending and will no longer be allowed to
engage in asset-based lending that ignores the consequences of such practices on
individual consumers.101

96

Id. § 1639c(e)(1).

97

Id. § 1639e.

98

For a more complete description of all the provisions, see Pridgen, supra note 61.

See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Eco
nomics of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255 (2002). Of course, investors did bear the risk
that the value of the securities would fall due to the underestimated risk of sudden, widespread
foreclosures in the wake of the collapse of the real estate market.
99

100

See supra text accompanying notes 68–72.

101

John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 175 (2011).
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Second, related to the “ability to repay” requirement, is the provision of a “safe
harbor” compliance alternative for lenders who might otherwise have to provide
extensive documentation to prove that consumers have the ability to repay. If
lenders offer a so-called “qualified mortgage” that has certain pro-consumer
characteristics, they will be presumed to have complied with the “ability to repay”
requirement.102 This is an example of what behavioral economists might term
“libertarian paternalism” whereby market participants are steered in welfarepromoting directions without removing freedom of choice.103 In this case, the
law tends to reward lenders who offer mortgages that contain better provisions
for consumers, but neither the lender nor the consumer are limited to contracts
with these terms. When lenders are steered toward these mortgages, consumers
will also be likely to go along because most mortgage agreements are offered as
standard form contracts in which it is highly unlikely that individual consumers
would have any ability to negotiate their provisions.
Third, the Mortgage Reform Act will implement a ban on broker compensation
via yield spread premiums, putting to rest a long-standing controversy that had
resulted in conflicting regulations under TILA and RESPA.104 The yield spread
premium (YSP) is a form of broker compensation in which the mortgage lender
pays fees to the mortgage broker based on the difference between market or
par rate and the rate actually charged to the borrower.105 The disadvantage to
consumers of this form of compensation is that the consumer may not realize
they could have gotten a loan with a lower interest rate by using a different broker
or by negotiating an upfront fee for the broker instead of using YSP. The use of
YSP as broker compensation rewards the broker for obtaining a higher interest
rate loan, which seems like a perverse incentive, perhaps not in the consumer’s
best interest.106 In addition, the use of YSP as broker compensation made it very
difficult for consumers to comparison shop for a mortgage broker based on fees
because the YSP aspect is hidden within the higher interest rate. Prior attempts at

102
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b). Qualified mortgage loans must have no negative amortization; no
interest only payments; no balloon payments; fully amortized rates; documentation of consumer
income and financial resources; creditor compliance with guidelines on debt-to-income ratios; total
points and fees that do not exceed 3% of the total loan amount; and the term of the loan is not
greater than thirty years. Id. § 1639c(b)(2).
103
See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159 (2003).
104
See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d) (2012). The TILA regulation
banning YSP had been scheduled to go into effect in April 2011.

See Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1171 (2003), for a good factual example and explanation of yield spread premiums. Formerly,
YSP was governed by both RESPA as a potential illegal kickback, and by TILA and Regulation Z,
as a part of the credit cost of the loan that had to be disclosed.
105

106
Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield
Spread Premiums, 12 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 289 (2007).
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disclosure of YSP only resulted in consumer confusion.107 This is another example
of a consumer issue with residential mortgage lending that required stronger
measures than disclosure alone.
Fourth, the new legislation places strict limits on prepayment penalties. They
are now limited in amount and duration or banned altogether.108 A prepayment
penalty means the borrowers pay extra if they want to pay off the loan early,
typically by re-financing or resale. The penalty is meant to compensate the
lender for the lost income expected on the loan that is not realized due to early
payment.109 Prepayment penalties, especially if they extend for long periods,
however, tend to discourage people from paying off loans with unfavorable
provisions by refinancing. While prepayment penalties should be factored in as a
potential cost of a loan, many consumers do not do so because this is a long-term
cost and is contingent on an uncertain future event. The “myopic” consumer does
not notice these types of costs.110 When a consumer does not consider such costs,
however, a loan may appear to be cheaper than it really is. Thus, the prepayment
penalty restrictions were necessary to protect consumers from this type of
hidden cost.
These and the other substantive guidelines for residential mortgage loans, as
contained in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, represent
the new direction in consumer protection. When it appears that disclosure
alone will not protect consumers due to flaws in the individual decision-making
process, or creditor abuse of consumer weaknesses, as demonstrated by behavioral
economics, the new law has stepped in with more direct measures. This same
pattern also appeared in the earlier law governing credit cards.

B. Credit Cards
Prior to the passage of the Credit CARD Act of 2009,111 many consumers
were plagued with large amounts of credit card debt. Congress found that part of
the reason for this debt escalation was the fact that consumers were being “tricked
In a study commissioned by the Federal Reserve Board in 2008, consumers who read
disclosures stating that mortgage brokers had a financial incentive to steer them to loans with higher
interest rates nonetheless persisted in their prior belief that brokers were working only in the best
interest of the borrower, despite the contradictory information they had just read. See Macro Int’l,
Inc., Consumer Testing of Mortgage Broker Disclosures 7–8, 12 (2008), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080714regzconstest.pdf.
107

108

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c) (2011).

Linda Singer, Zachary Best & Nina Simon, Breaking Down Financial Reform: A Summary of
the Major Consumer Protection Portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 14 J. Consumer & Com. L. 2 (2010).
109

110

Bar-Gill, supra note 72, at 1119–21.

Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11124, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
111
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and trapped” by various credit card practices, such as teaser rates, rate-jacking
(unexpected rate increases after an account has been opened), late fees, penalty
rates, over-the-limit fees, unfair billing practices and excessive marketing to young
consumers, all of which made it difficult for consumers to manage their credit
card accounts.112 The Credit CARD Act amends TILA with specific substantive
provisions designed to address the “tricks and traps” and other specific complaints
from consumers about credit cards, although the law also initiated certain
improvements in credit card disclosures as well. In doing so, Congress chose the
path of imposing minimum substantive requirements in certain problem areas in
lieu of the more traditional approach of relying solely on disclosure and rational
consumer choice.113
The Credit CARD Act’s substantive consumer protection provisions can be
divided into four categories: provisions affecting rates, billing practices, fees, and
protections for young consumers. The provisions affecting each of these aspects of
credit cards are summarized below.
One of the biggest consumer complaints leading up to the CARD Act was the
practice of credit card issuers unexpectedly increasing interest rates on balances.114
These rate increases could be based on the unlimited “change of terms” clauses
that appeared in most credit card contracts, “universal default” provisions that
allowed creditors to increase rates based on a consumer’s performance on other
unrelated accounts, or due to “penalty” rates imposed for a series of late payments
or default. Unexpected rate increases led to some consumers being unable to pay
off their credit card debt. The CARD Act does not impose any ceiling on credit
card interest rates, but it does limit certain practices associated with rate increases.
These substantive limits include the following:


Creditors must provide at least forty-five days’ notice of rate
increases115 and may not charge an increased rate to prior
balances;116

112
See H.R. Rep. No. 111-88 (2009). Many consumer advocates use the phrase “tricks and
traps” to criticize bad practices in the credit card industry. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren on Credit
Card ‘Tricks and Traps,’ Now on PBS (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/501/credittraps.html.

Zachary J. Luck, Bringing Change to Credit Cards: Did the Credit Card Act Create a New Era
of Federal Credit Card Consumer Protection?, 5 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 205 (2011).
113

114

Levitin, supra note 77.

15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(1), (2) (2011). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.9(c)(2)(i),1026.9(c)(2)(i)
(2012). Rates may be increased after the first year for new transactions, provided the forty-five-day
advance notice requirement is complied with.
115

116

15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(c)(1) (2011).
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“Teaser” or promotional rates must last at least six months;117



Creditors may not increase rates based on the consumer’s
payment pattern in connection with other accounts (universal
default) unless they meet certain prerequisites;118 and



If a rate is increased due to failure to receive the minimum
payment within sixty days after the due date, the creditor
must reinstate the prior rate if the creditor receives the
minimum required payment for a period of six months.119

427

Credit card billing practices were another source of consumer complaints prior
to the passage of the CARD Act. Consumers often seek to avoid finance charges
by paying off their balances in full during the “free ride” period. Consumers also
seek to avoid late fees by paying their bills on time. However, some creditors
were known to apply a finance charge to prior balances if the full balance was
not paid off in a given month, a practice known as “double cycle billing,” which
eliminated the “free ride” period on the prior balance for those consumers. Also,
due dates were variable, bills were mailed at such times that the “free ride” period
was shortened, and the cut-off time on the due date to avoid late fees could
be at an unexpected time of day such as noon or early afternoon.120 Different
rates are often charged to different types of balances, such as cash advances versus
purchases. Creditors in the past were known to apply payments first to the balance
with a lower rate leaving more in the high rate balance. In addition, credit card
statements often encouraged, or at least did not discourage, the payment of the
minimum payment amount, which had become increasingly small. Financially
unsophisticated consumers often did not realize the consequences of paying
only the minimum amount each month and carrying a balance, which usually
resulted in payment over time of large amounts of finance charges.121 The CARD
Act attempts to address many of these issues regarding billing practices with the
following provisions:


117

Ban on “double-cycle billing,” a practice which had
eliminated the “free ride” on prior balances if payment was
not made in full by the due date;122

15 U.S.C. § 1666i-2(b) (2011); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.55, 1026.55 (2012).

See 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(a)–(b) (banning rate increases except if the creditor provides a
forty-five-day notice of the increase, a consumer right to cancel the account, and they do not apply
the increased rate to previously accumulated balances); id. § 1637(i).
118

119

15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(b)(4).

Norman I. Silber, Late Charges, Regular Billing, and Reasonable Consumers: A Rationale for
a Late Payment Act, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 855 (2008).
120

121
Carolyn Carter, Elizabeth Renuart, Margot Saunders & Chi Chi Wu, The Credit Card
Market and Regulation: In Need of Repair, 10 N.C. Banking Inst. 23, 47 (2006).
122

15 U.S.C. § 1637(j).
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Card issuers must apply the consumer’s payment first to
balances with higher rates;123



Must mail bills twenty-one days before the due date;124



The due date must be same every month;125



The cutoff time to avoid late payment on the due date must
be no earlier than 5:00 p.m.;126 and



Card issuers must provide a minimum payment disclosure
on the monthly statement, showing payoff time and amount
if only the minimum payment is made.127

Vol. 13

Another common complaint of credit card consumers was that the fees being
charged were unexpected, rigid, arbitrary, and seemed disproportionate to the
transgression or to the cost imposed on the card issuer. For example, the same late
fee was charged whether the payment was one day late or much later and whether
the balance was $5.00 or $500.00. “Back-end” credit card fees had become a large
percentage of card issuer revenue in the lead-up to the financial crisis. Consumers,
on the other hand, due to hyperbolic discounting, over-optimism, and a focus on
salient features, failed to factor in the amount they were likely to pay in fees when
comparison shopping for the best deal in credit cards.128 Many consumers did
not expect to be charged over-the-limit fees without being notified at the point
of sale that their transaction was refused.129 Other one-time or annual fees for
subprime consumers were especially burdensome, sometimes leaving very little
credit available for their use until the initial fees were paid.130 Following are some
of the provisions of the CARD Act that address the issues associated with credit
card fees:

123

15 U.S.C. § 1666c(b)(1) (2011); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.53(a), 1026.53(a) (2012).

124

15 U.S.C. § 1666b(a)–(b) (2011); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(b)(2)(ii), 1026.5(b)(2)(ii).

125

15 U.S.C. § 1637(o); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.7(b)(11), 1026.7(b)(11).

126

15 U.S.C. § 1666c(a) (2011); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.10(b)(2)(ii), 1026.10(b)(2)(ii).

127

15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.7(b)(12), 1026.7(b)(12).

128

Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 79.

See, e.g., Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 (2004) (holding that “overthe-limit” fees should not be considered a “finance charge” under TILA).
129

130

See, e.g., Perry v. First Nat’l Bank, 459 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Penalties and fees must be “reasonable and proportional”
to the omission or violation for which they are imposed.131
Under the relevant regulations, most late payment fees are
limited to $25.00 or $35.00 and over-the-limit fees are
capped at $35.00; 132



Over-the-limit fees must be expressly elected by consumers
to permit creditors to charge a fee to complete transactions
involving the extension of credit in excess of the amount of
authorized credit for the account being used; 133 and



Fees (other than late fees, over-the-limit fees, or fees for
returned payments) cannot be more than 25% of available
credit in the first twelve months (no “fee harvester” cards).134

429

Prior to the Credit CARD Act, consumer advocates were particularly
concerned about vulnerable consumers, such as college students, who were being
bombarded with on-campus credit card marketing only to wind up with large
amounts of credit card debt they could not handle.135 In response to these concerns,
the Credit CARD Act contains a provision that prohibits the issuance of a credit
card to consumers who are under twenty-one unless they have a co-signor who is
twenty-one or older and is financially responsible, or unless the young consumer
can show they have independent means of repaying the obligation.136 This appears
at first glance to be a rather extensive restriction on credit cards for young people.
However, some have criticized the measure for not going far enough to protect
young people.137 The regulations implementing the statute say the card issuer
can look at the consumer’s ability to repay only the minimum payment, and can
look to sources of income in the future like seasonal work.138 Thus, relatively
under-employed college students under the age of twenty-one are still likely able
to obtain credit cards despite the provisions of the Act. In addition, the co-signor
provisions, while likely aimed at parents or guardians, actually allow slightly older
college friends who are at least twenty-one to co-sign for a younger classmate, even
though the co-signor may not be any more mature than the card applicant and

131

15 U.S.C. § 1665d(a) (2011).

132

12 C.F.R. §§ 226.52(b), 1026.52(b).

133

15 U.S.C. § 1637(k)(1) (2011); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.56, 1026.56.

134

15 U.S.C. § 1637(n); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.52, 1026.52.

See Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call To Limit Credit Card Solicitations
on College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 191 (2004).
135

136

15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.51(b), 1026.51(b).

Eboni S. Nelson, From the Schoolhouse to the Poorhouse: The Credit CARD Act’s Failure to
Adequately Protect Young Consumers, 56 Vill. L. Rev. 1 (2011).
137

138

12 C.F.R. §§ 226.51 & Supp. I subpt. G, 1026.51.
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may end up saddled with their friend’s improvident credit card debt.139 Critics of
the young consumer credit card protections say that these restrictions are contrary
to the prevailing law of majority for most other contracts (set at eighteen) and
will cut off an important source of credit for young entrepreneurs.140 The current
situation appears to be that it is more difficult for college-age consumers to obtain
a credit card, but it is far from impossible.141 Perhaps the added hurdles will inspire
some caution on the part of young consumers. At least the days when students
signed up for a credit card to get a free tee-shirt appear to be a thing of the past.

V. Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection—
Are They Good or Bad?
The sea changes in consumer protection law outlined in this article are
not without critics, of course. Any new direction in public policy will be hotly
debated. So what are the major arguments pro and con in this area? A brief
overview follows.
One of the major arguments for basing consumer protection rules on rational
consumer choice theory, rather than behavioral economics, is that both antitrust
and consumer protection law should be based on the same consumer welfare
theories. Rational consumer choice theory, which has long been the bedrock
principle of antitrust, is itself based on the principle of consumer sovereignty
where consumers’ revealed preferences in the marketplace dictate policy.142 Thus,
in the model of perfect competition, informed consumers acting rationally in the
marketplace, unhindered by market failures or anticompetitive conspiracies, will
achieve allocative efficiency, such that the economy produces the goods consumers
want at a competitive price.143 The same theory carries over to consumer protection
laws such as TILA, where the purpose of the law is to promote informed consumer
choice in a competitive market for consumer credit, which in turn will maximize
consumer welfare.
The use of behavioral economics, on the other hand, especially when
it comes to providing a justification for specific substantive protections for
consumers, arguably could mean that consumer choices are controlled more by
139
Dave Carpenter, Credit Cards and College Students Can Be a Dangerous Mix, USA
Today Money, July 12, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/college/
story/2012-07-14/credit-cards-and-college-students/56170448/1?csp=34money&dlvrit=110940.
140
Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy
Rule in the Federal Credit CARD Act, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 407 (2011).
141
See Jim Hawkins, The CARD Act on Campus, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1471 (2012) (setting
forth the results of a survey of college-age consumers).
142
Wright, supra note 80. See also Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The
Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 44 (1998).
143
Ernest Gellhorn, William E. Kovacic, & Stephen Calkins, Antitrust Law And Economics
In A Nutshell 67–73 (5th ed. 2004).
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the government and less by consumers themselves.144 If consumers cannot, for
psychological or sociological reasons, make self-interested rational choices in
certain situations, then to protect them, a third party (a legislature or government
agency) may have to determine what is a rational choice for consumers and what
is not. This could occur by regulations banning certain credit practices, such as
the use of yield spread premiums for mortgage broker compensation, as opposed
to simply warning consumers about the potential consequences but still allowing
such contracts to go forward. Alternatively, it could be a form of “nudge” or
“de-biasing” by which the regulatory provision requires that the default choice for
the consumer is the one deemed most rational, while still allowing consumers to
opt out and make a different choice should they so desire.145 Some say this will
result in the “nirvana fallacy,” i.e., the false idea that such third parties can in fact
determine and promote the “true preferences” of consumers.146 Others point out
that government policy makers are also human and could themselves fall victim
to behavioral biases, potentially undermining the rationality of the regulatory
choices.147 Still others call approaches based on behavioral economics the
“new paternalism.”148
While to critics the ascendancy of behavioral economics as a basis for
consumer protection policy may be cause for concern, to others this particular
discipline seems more realistic than rational consumer choice theory as a basis
for understanding marketplace behavior.149 It also comports with everyday
experience. The insights of behavioral economics can be used to explain the failure
of the disclosure regime of TILA.150 If consumers always act rationally in their
own self-interest when provided with adequate information, why did they persist
in signing residential mortgages that had unaffordable costs and unfavorable
provisions that were clearly disclosed to them? Some of the phenomena discussed
above, such as bounded rationality, myopia, optimism, and trust of authority
figures, concepts that have been associated with behavioral economics, can help
explain this paradox.151 The new approach to consumer protection also addresses
the balance of power between consumers and marketers. Individual consumers
are hampered by cognitive barriers on a daily basis in a wide variety of transactions
whereas marketers have the time and resources to study human behavior in a

Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins,
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1033 (2012).
144

Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 103. See also Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein,
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale Univ. Press 2008).
145

146

Wright, supra note 80, at 2239–40.

147

See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006).

148

Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 323, 325–28 (2008).

149

Rubin, supra note 63.

150

Pridgen, supra note 61. See also Braucher, supra note 41.

151

See supra text accompanying notes 68–79.
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focused way and try to use what they learn to sell their products.152 Admittedly,
both marketers and government regulators are indeed “human,” and subject
to behavioral biases, but unlike consumers, the marketers and regulators have
the luxury to take the time to study the market choices as well as the consumer
behavioral data to support their actions.
Finally, the application of behavioral economics does not mean that reliance
on competitive markets as the best way to promote consumer welfare has been
abandoned. Rather, there has been a renewed recognition that when the competitive
marketplace suffers from a lack of transparency and fairness, it will not fulfill
its proper function. Thus, Congress charged the new CFPB to ensure that “all
consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services
and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent,
and competitive.”153 Some new initiatives in consumer credit regulation also take
the approach of “nudging” better choices, such as by establishing a “safe harbor”
for mortgage lenders who offer consumers a “qualified mortgage,” rather than
simply requiring all mortgages to have these provisions.154 Rather than taking away
consumers’ “liberty” to be victimized by “unfair or deceptive” creditor practices,
these new laws, based in part on behavioral economics, allow competition to
occur on a level playing field and with minimum rules of safety and fairness.155
Another type of critique of the focus on specific creditor practices or contract
clauses is that such an approach will be only a temporary fix and is doomed to fail
in the long run. Once the law prohibits a specific practice, it is posited that the
market or new technologies will devise a “work-around” that is not prohibited but
that achieves the same result. For example, if creditor fee “x” is banned or limited,
creditor fee “y” will replace it. This insight was part of the reason for endowing
traditional consumer protection agencies, such as the FTC, with general authority
over “unfair and deceptive” trade practices, so that new and unforeseen forms of
consumer abuse can be dealt with as they arise. As stated in the House Conference
Report on the original FTC Act:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field.
Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and

152

See Bar-Gill, supra note 64.

153

12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2011).

154

See supra text accompanying notes 102–03.

See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14 (originating the idea that consumer credit regulation
should be more like other consumer product safety regulations, such as those governing the com
mon toaster).
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prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again.
If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would
undertake an endless task.156
In setting up the CFPB, Congress gave the agency very specific mandates in
some parts of the law, such as the Mortgage Reform Act, but also gave the agency
authority over “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” practices in the relevant financial
sectors.157 Thus, there is the potential for the CFPB to address unforeseen
consumer abuses that were not even imagined at the time the law was written.
This is particularly true with regard to the “abusive” practices standard, which
allows the CFPB to regulate in instances where a credit practice “materially
interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of
a consumer financial product or service,” or where financial service providers
“take unreasonable advantage of ” the consumer’s lack of understanding or
inability to protect their own interests.158 One author has stated that the CFPB’s
“anti-abuse regulation based on behavioral economics promises to be an
important development, arguably the most significant innovation in consumer
law in decades.”159
The new consumer protection legislation discussed here, like all new
legislation, will involve some costs as well as benefits. The consumer credit market
was already regulated prior to the new laws and agency, so the question is whether
the costs outweigh the potential benefits. For better or worse, in order to achieve
any benefit from new consumer protections, there will be costs imposed on the
regulated parties and indirectly on society as a whole. In this case, the potential
benefit to consumers in the form of protection from harmful choices is difficult
to measure because the benefit is in not doing something that might have been
harmful. Therefore, it is akin to trying to prove a negative. On the other hand,
the industry can readily quantify the cost of new regulations on creditors, simply
in terms of transition and compliance costs. The benefit/cost issue is a legitimate
question, and the answer will not be known until the new regulatory wave is fully
played out. Congress has arguably anticipated this issue by stipulating that the
CFPB must conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the effects of any new rules on both
consumers and creditors.160 Any reduction in the likelihood of future financial
crises would be a benefit worth some cost.

156

H.R. Rep. No. 1142, at 19 (1914).

157

12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2).

158

Id. § 5531. See also supra text accompanying notes 34–42.

Braucher, supra note 41, at 111. Despite this broad grant of authority, however, the CFPB
is constrained by the statutory definitions of these general terms, as well as indirectly by years of
FTC precedent defining “unfair and deceptive” trade practices.
159

160

12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2) (2011).
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Another related criticism of the new consumer protection approach is that
these new laws will reduce the supply of consumer credit by raising costs to
creditors who will in turn pass on these higher costs to consumers.161 This fear
of the high cost of compliance has inevitably accompanied any new initiative to
protect consumers, but often proves to be exaggerated. For instance, in 1975 at a
Congressional hearing to consider amending the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to
require notices of reasons for adverse action, it was reported that Sears Roebuck &
Company had estimated the cost for compliance would be approximately $5.00
per letter. After the law was enacted, Sears reported to the Federal Reserve Board
that the actual average cost of compliance with this particular requirement was
59¢ per letter.162 More recently, the new consumer protection rules for credit cards
contained in the CARD Act of 2009 were claimed to be likely to restrict access to
consumer credit and raise its cost. A study by the Center for Responsible Lending,
however, showed that one year after the legislation went into effect, there was an
increased transparency of credit card pricing, credit card prices remained level,
and the supply of credit cards was not constricted.163
Another potential cost is that some of these new laws will prevent some people
from obtaining credit who otherwise would have been able to do so. Indeed,
there will soon be a duty imposed on lenders to assure a borrower’s ability to
repay in all residential mortgage loans164 as well as credit card accounts.165 The
Credit CARD Act also bans the extension of credit in the form of credit cards
to all consumers under the age of twenty-one, subject to narrow exceptions that
focus on their ability to repay.166 These requirements, by definition, will eliminate
some borrowers who might otherwise have been able to obtain loans, however
improvident they might have been. The business community argues that they and
individual consumers are in the best position to decide creditworthiness without
having to comply with government standards.167 On the other hand, this denial of
mortgages or credit cards to persons who lack the ability to pay for these items was
deemed necessary to counteract the tidal wave of predatory lending that led up
to the financial crisis.168 Avoiding the improvident extension of credit to persons
See Evans & Wright, supra note 25. Note that the analysis in this article was based on a
2009 Treasury Department proposal, whereas the Dodd-Frank Act that ultimately set up the CFPB
contained some significant differences from that proposal.
161

162
John A. Spanogle, Ralph J. Rohner, Dee Pridgen & Jeff Sovern, Consumer Law,
Cases and Materials 396–97 (3d ed. 2007).

See Credit Card Clarity: CARD Act Reform Works, Center for Responsible Lending (June
1, 2011), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/research-analysis/credit-card-clarity.html.
163

164

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2011).

165

Id. § 1665e.

166

Id. § 1637(c)(8)(A)–(B).

Manley Williams & Sara E. Emley, CARD Act’s Ability to Pay Proposal Ignites Public Policy
Debate, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 1417, 1427–29 (2011).
167

168

Pottow, supra note 101, at 205–08.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol13/iss2/1

30

Pridgen: Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and

2013

Sea Changes in Consumer Protection

435

who lack the ability to repay can also protect society and the economy as a whole.
It is well known that an increase in the financial distress of consumers can have
effects not only on the individual or individuals immediately involved, but also
on their families, their neighborhoods (foreclosure blight), and their creditors
(assuming bankruptcy or default). Indeed, it could be argued that improvident
lending brought down the U.S. economy and led to the Great Recession of 2008.
Finally, critics of the CFPB are concerned that the new agency is not only
strong but perhaps too strong, lacks sufficient Congressional oversight, and
has too broad a mandate. Some may favor the more traditional independent
regulatory commission structure of the FTC, which is more directly controlled by
Congress, rather than the relatively independent CFPB structure. Many are fearful
of the potential flood of new federal regulations that may be heading toward the
consumer financial sector as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act.169 Players in the
fringe banking sectors like payday lending, pawn broking, and automobile title
lenders will be subject to federal regulation for the first time.170 Giving the CFPB
authority not only over “unfair and deceptive” consumer credit practices, but also
over “abusive” practices is also a point of concern because this is uncharted water
for consumer financial regulation.171
Despite the misgivings of some, the creation of the CFPB was necessary
to provide more effective consumer protection. The legislative blueprint for
the CFPB has succeeded in uniting the previously balkanized regulation of the
consumer financial sector by consolidating functions that were spread out over
the bank regulatory agencies and the FTC.172 This change alone eliminated the
prior issues of conflicted missions, lack of focus, and regulated entities shopping
for favorable regulators. In addition, although Congress does not directly fund the
CFPB, the Comptroller General must audit the Bureau annually, and the director
must submit an annual report to Congress on its operations.173 This seems like a
reasonable compromise between the situation of an agency like the FTC, which
can be effectively muzzled by political pressure, and a completely unaccountable
agency (which the CFPB is not). Placing non bank “fringe” providers under some
federal supervision is not simply gratuitous regulation. This sector deals with the

169

Caggiano, Dozier, Hackett & Axelson, supra note 84, at 472.

See Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link between Fringe Banking
and Financial Distress, 86 Ind. L.J. 1361, 1380–82 (2011); Michael B. Mierzewski, Beth S.
DeSimone, Jeremy W. Hochberg & Brian P. Larkin, The Dodd-Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products and Services,
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financially vulnerable, and the industry players were not constrained in the same
ways as their counterparts in the banking industry. Thus, extending regulation to
this sector may mean more uniform rules for credit products, regardless of their
source. Finally, the extension of authority to “abusive” practices was necessary
to address marketing practices that exploit consumer weakness, and that were
not adequately remedied by disclosure alone. Nonetheless, it is not an unlimited
grant of power. The statute contains a specific definition of “abusive” that focuses
on practices that interfere with the ability of consumers to understand the terms
and conditions they are being offered, or that take unreasonable advantage of
the consumer’s lack of understanding, inability to protect their own interests, or
reasonable reliance on a trusted advisor.174

VI. Conclusion
These are indeed exciting and turbulent times for consumer protection
law. With the creation of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
associated changes in the substance of federal consumer credit laws, the field
is undergoing a “sea-change”175 that will play out for years to come. Congress
established the new agency to unite the previously diffuse regulation of providers
in the consumer financial services sector, changing from shared authority among
the Federal Reserve Board, other bank regulatory agencies, and the FTC, to
regulation under a single authority. The CFPB was set up in a way that gives it
the potential to be more powerful and more effective than its older predecessor in
the federal consumer protection arena, the FTC, because it has a single director,
not a Commission, with funding from the Federal Reserve System, not Congress,
and has authority to police “unfair, deceptive, and abusive” consumer financial
practices. At the same time, the law that created the CFPB also gives states more
of an ability to raise the level of consumer protection by sharply curbing the
federal preemption power, which had previously been used to prevent states from
reacting to predatory lending abuses.
This new approach to consumer protection, embodied in the CFPB itself,
and in the new legislation that it will administer, is widely understood to owe its
theoretical foundation to the field known as “behavioral economics.” This body
of scholarship points out that contrary to the teachings of classical economics, the
average consumer does not always act as “homo economicus,” making rational
choices to maximize individual welfare in all transactions. Behavioral economics
has forwarded the seemingly common sense insight that consumers can be pushed
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toward irrational marketplace choices by the exploitation of certain cognitive
barriers that we all experience. This perceived consumer irrationality does not
mean that all consumers act irrationally in all their choices. Nor does the new
approach to consumer protection mean that we are doomed to exist in a world
where self-righteous government bureaucrats dole out “plain vanilla” goods that
they think are best for the population. On the contrary, behavioral economics
simply points out that certain types of market practices or manipulations tend to
block rational consumer choice in certain situations. One insight of behavioral
economics is that pure information may not be enough to protect consumers in all
situations, due to the circumstances in which the consumer choice is being made.
Thus, laws that attempt to eliminate specific distorting or exploiting practices,
or those that use pro-consumer defaults or other forms of “soft paternalism” to
“nudge” consumers to better choices, will assist consumers in making rational
choices in the marketplace. In the end, the “sea-change” in consumer protection,
as fundamental as it is, does not eliminate free consumer choice in a free market.
It simply recognizes the practical limits and artificiality of putting all the
responsibility for consumer protection on individual consumers. The government
and financial service providers must also do their part.
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